We continue our look at how current standards, and regulations hold back best practices.

This part 5 of a multipart look at issues in valuation standards.  Editor’s Note: This is Standards, part 3.5 of George Dell’s series on How Do I Move to EBV? Links to the earlier posts are here.

This part is interesting in that it really more of a look at human behavior.  This in the darkness of bias covered by personal purpose.  And by the groupthink of accepted exception . . .

Market value.  What is it?  Easy, right?

So, what is a “market?”  And what is “value?”

Here, we look at two issues:

  1. Is “price” a good measure of value?
  2. Do we respect the FHFA/GSE definition of value?

Warren Buffett’s most famous quotes (via Benjamin Graham) is, “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.”  This statement seems simple, but opens up several financial and motivational issues.

PRICE AS VALUE

A place to live, entertain, have sex, eat, and feel safe – is not all!  Buyer motivation also includes wealth-building, cyclical speculation, over-exuberance, currency/political hedging, an alternative to renting, ‘trophy-property’ prestige, and just plain land banking.

If we consider today’s housing collateral risk value (like the GSEs), that (downside risk) value should be quite different from the upside potential value of an investor or speculator.  In fact, each of the above will have a different buyer value as from market price.

Buyer value is not price, except by accident.

Admittedly users, such as the GSEs adjust the market price to suit current risk or greed measures.  We can call this the risk/greed tradeoff.  For lending, the greater the personal benefit, whether a commission, or a promotion, or an annual bonus – the higher is the personal risk tolerance, (with a transfer of the loss risk to the public – today the FHFA and “interagency” regulators).

Price is different from the value to a particular buyer/investor.  Value is, and should be, different for a collateral investor or an equity investor.  Lender safety is always subject to great tail-risk price losses, but gain nothing from tail-risk price gains.  Conversely, investors can compensate tail-risk losses against tail-risk gains.  (Tail risk can be defined as ‘black swan’ events, occurring rarely, but regularly!)

GROUPTHINK

In several prior blogs and papers (read them here) we have described how groupthink long has taken priority over the actual definition of market value, as currently required by our GSEs, and as written in the USPAP Advisory Opinion 22.  This “market value” requires certain conditions and assumptions.  In brief:

  • A “most probable price” (which mathematically does not exist);
  • Buyer and seller are prudent and knowledgeable (homebuyers are seldom knowledgeable);
  • No undue stimulus, (such as protection from downside tail risk);
  • “Based on a market perspective” (which we know should be a personal value perspective);
  • “Typical” motivation, (which we know does not exist);
  • Parties are well-informed or well-advised (a questionable motive of commissioned agents);

“Market [price] perspective replaces a user’s perspective.”  Price may not be the best value to apply to loans, investments, speculations, personal use, or even for any “reparation” or other socially adjusted or special-benefit or special-punishment value.

The above conditions and assumptions are industry-disregarded.  This is groupthink.

It doesn’t matter if its not true.  So long as everyone goes along.  Groupthing.